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Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis badly hit worldwide economies and forced 
shareholders, creditors, and liquidators to seek legal redress.1 In many cases, 
aggrieved parties sought to pierce the “corporate veil” and hold company directors 
liable for their financial losses.2 In recent years, shareholder and creditor lawsuits 
have also targeted professional auditors.3 
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords issued an important auditors’ 
liability decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens.4 A 3:2 majority declined to 
hold liable a one-man company’s auditors, where the auditors failed to discover 
that the company’s controlling director had perpetrated a fraud.5 
The main issue concerned the effective use of the ex turpi causa defense to defeat 
a claim brought by a company’s liquidator against its auditors.6 The objective was to 
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 1. See Mark Dawkins, English Law on Piercing the Corporate Veil Reconsidered in Light of Key Judgment, 
WORLD SEC. LAW REP., Dec. 2012, at 2. 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Cast Art Indus., L.L.C. v. KPMG, L.L.P., 36 A.3d 1049 (N.J. 2012) (involving an auditing firm 
that failed to report “accounting irregularities” in its client’s financial statements); First Amended Complaint at 
2, Rick D. Lange v. KPMG, L.L.P., No. 4:12-CV-3148 (D. Neb. June 22, 2012) (alleging that an auditor “masked 
the truth” about its client’s poor financial condition). 
 4. [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  On October 1, 2009, the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court supplanted the House of Lords as the United Kingdom’s highest appeals court.  See 
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 (U.K.); From House of Lords to Supreme Court, PARLIAMENT.UK (July 23, 
2009), http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2009/07/from-house-of-lords-to-supreme-court/. 
 5. Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1451, 1470, 1479, 1503, 1505, 1535.  Lord Justices Phillips, Walker, and 
Brown voted to dismiss the appeal.  Id. at 1470, 1503, 1505.  Lord Justices Foscote and Mance would have 
allowed the appeal.  Id. at 1479, 1535. 
 6. Id. at 1391, 1398; see W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 1154–55 (18th ed. 2010) (“It 
is a well-known principle of the law of contract that if the claimant has to found his claim on an illegal act or 
agreement he will fail: ex turpi causa non oritur action. Though that maxim may be properly confined to cases 
involving contracts there are also certainly cases of tort in which to allow recovery to a claimant implicated in 
illegality is against public policy. The difficulty arises in determining when a claim (or part of it, for illegality 
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recover losses from professional insurance carriers.7 However, the knowledge and 
fraud of the company’s only director was attributed to the company, which could 
not claim against its auditors for their failure to discover the fraud that the 
company itself committed through its controlling mind.8 In this instance, the ex 
turpi causa defense provided its full benefits. 
When corporate governance, especially in banks, focuses on implementing 
stricter controls and accountability, one must highlight that auditors play a crucial 
role in maintaining the financial equilibrium and/or capital ratio of corporate 
bodies.9 The public expects from auditors the highest degree of care, diligence, and 
professionalism. Yet such duty cannot encompass that of finding a director’s own 
fraud, where the director not only commits the fraud, but also provides financial 
information to accounting professionals.10 
This Article assesses the extent to which company auditors (and indeed any third 
parties) would escape professional liability in disputes tainted by fraud if they 
proved that a company and its controlling mind should be treated as one. 
I. To Whom Do Auditors Owe Their Duties? 
Certainly, auditors have been the center of attention and legal claims when they 
have audited companies whose financial situations reach the point of no return. 
However, auditors are not insurers in the sense that they do not contractually agree 
to indemnify a company should it become insolvent,11 nor do they “guarantee that 
the books do correctly shew the true position of the company’s affairs. . . .”12 
Rather, auditors guarantee that they will discharge their duties with the 
professional standard expected in their demanding role. They are not bound to 
discover the truth, especially in cases where company directors have cleverly 
 
may affect only one element of the damages claimed) will be rejected for this reason. As is so often the case, it 
may make no difference whether one rests the decision on lack of a duty of care or upon a separate ground of 
illegality, since the nature of the claimant’s behaviour is a matter which is relevant to the question of whether it 
is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty.”). 
 7. Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1391, 1398. 
 8. Id. at 1409. 
 9.  F I N.  R E P O R T I N G  CO U N C I L,  THE AUDIT OF BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 88 (2011), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/PN-19-(Revised)-The-A 
udit-of-Banks-and-Building-So.pdf. 
 10. See Fomento Ltd. v. Selsdon Fountain Pen Co., [1958] 1 W.L.R. 45 (H.L.) at 52 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (limiting auditors’ duty to investigate clients’ finances); infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
Auditors may demand information from directors.  See Fomento, [1958] 1 W.L.R. at 52. 
 11. In re London and General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 673 at 683 (Eng.). 
 12. Id. 
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designed and concealed the real financial situation of the corporate body.13 
Consequently, “[a]n auditor is not bound to be a detective, or . . . to approach his 
work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something 
wrong.”14 In more eloquent terms, an auditor is a “watch-dog, but not a 
bloodhound.”15 
Having highlighted the fact that auditors could be targeted in cases of company 
insolvency, it is paramount to ascertain the potential claimants. At least two large 
groups exist: internal claimants (company, employees) and external claimants 
(third parties or company outsiders).16 
The Companies Act of 2006 may not be as clear as one would like in the sense of 
clarifying whether auditors are company officers.17 For example, Section 487(1) 
establishes that “[a]n auditor or auditors of a private company hold office in 
accordance with the terms of their appointment. . . .”18 This phrasing gives the 
impression that auditors who hold office are company officers. However, Section 
1121(2) complicates this issue, as it does not define auditors as officers.19 
Inconsistencies exist, especially in legal cases where the point is still open for 
debate.20 
Arguably, auditors appointed to carry out the functions established in 
Companies Act Sections 495 to 497(a) are not company officers;21 on the contrary, 
they enter into contractual agreements with the corporate body to provide their 
professional services. They do not enter into an employment relationship with the 
 
 13. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 507(1) (U.K.) (“A person to whom this section applies commits an 
offence if he knowingly or recklessly causes a report under section 495 (auditor’s report on company’s annual 
accounts) to include any matter that is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”). 
 14. In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 279 at 288 (Eng.) (concluding that auditors constituted 
company “officers” under the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 63, § 10 (Eng.)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (considering 
whether auditors negligently prepared reports that led a third-party company to purchase shares in a 
corporation); Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (involving an internal claimant). 
 17. See Companies Act, c. 46; infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 18. C. 46, § 487(1) (emphasis added). 
 19. C. 46, § 1121(2).  For officer-liability purposes, “officer” means “(a) any director, manager or 
secretary,” or “(b) any person who is to be treated as an officer of the company for the purposes of the provision 
in question.”  Id. 
 20. See, e.g., R v. Shacter, [1960] 2 Q.B. 252 at 257–58 (Eng.) (holding that an auditor qualified as an 
“officer” under the Companies Act because a company had appointed him to “hold office”). 
 21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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company.22 This point is of major significance in identifying potential internal 
claimants who may have been victims of substandard professional services. 
A company could also be a victim if an auditor, in breach of statutory provisions, 
presented a report to the company’s directors showing the insufficiency of the 
securities on which the company invested its capital, but presented to the 
shareholders a less detailed report which stated that the value of the assets was 
dependent on realization, so as to deceive the shareholders as to the actual financial 
situation of the company and lead them to pass a resolution authorizing the 
payments of dividends out of capital rather than profits.23 In a situation like this, 
auditors could be found guilty of misfeasance and held personally liable for the 
company’s payment of dividends out of capital.24 
The leading authority of Caparo Industries v. Dickman25 is clear that company 
auditors, in principle, owe their duties to the corporate body and not to outsiders.26 
Hence, it is up to the company to claim against the auditors whose lack of care or 
diligence has caused losses to the corporate body.27 Typical claims involve losses 
accruing as a result of reliance on what happened to be negligently prepared, 
misleading, or inaccurate accounts.28 The action itself will be based on breach of 
contract or in negligent misstatements leading to a claim in tort (company vs. 
auditor).29 
On the other hand, outsiders find it more difficult to make claims against 
auditors who, as explained above, do not owe them the so-called duty of care.30 For 
a claim of this nature to succeed, the third party has the burden to prove that 
his/her situation is different in the sense that the auditor has assumed certain 
responsibility to him/her, as to the accuracy of the reports and/or accounts.31 Hedley 
Byrne v. Heller Partners32 is authority for pure economic loss claims in tort, based on 
 
 22. See George A. Locke, Employer’s Retention of Control over Independent Contractor, 5 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 2D 219, 223 (1974) (defining an independent contractor as a person who contracts to perform work 
“according to his own methods”). 
 23. See In re London General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 673 at 680–85 (Eng.). 
 24. Id. at 695–96. 
 25. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 26. See id. at 606 (finding “no reason in policy or principle why auditors should be deemed to have a 
special relationship with non-shareholders contemplating investment in [a] company in reliance on [its] 
published accounts”). But see Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller Partners, [1964] 1 A.C. 465 (H.L.) 502–03 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (“[I]f someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply 
that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise.”). 
 27. PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 835 (9th ed. 2012). 
 28. Id. at 837. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 847. 
 31. See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 33. 
 32. [1964] 1 A.C. 465 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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negligent misrepresentations. However, it will not be enough for the outside party 
to prove that an auditor negligently prepared the report or accounts on which 
he/she relied and caused losses, if the outsider fails to prove also that the auditor 
owed him/her a duty of care.33 At this moment, Caparo Industries comes into play.34 
The case concerned auditors’ liability to third parties.35 At the spine of this decision 
lies the fact that the auditor must have assumed personal responsibility to the third 
party as to the accuracy of the report or account to create the duty of care—the 
breach of which could give rise to a claim in tort.36 The general rule is that auditors 
owe their duties to the corporate body.37 On the other hand, they owe a duty to 
outsiders only when they assumed personal responsibility to third parties.38 The 
claim in Caparo Industries failed because the third party, who relied on the accounts 
and suffered losses, did not prove the test of assumption of responsibility and 
consequent proximity.39 Therefore, the auditors escaped liability.40 
In James McNaughton Paper Group v. Hicks Anderson & Co.,41 it was held that the 
accountants of the target company, in a takeover scenario, did not owe a duty of 
care to those who wanted to take over the business.42 The draft accounts had been 
prepared for the target company, to which auditors owed their duties.43 Later, there 
were some inaccuracies in the draft accounts and the claimant (bidder) suffered 
losses and damages as a result.44 The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the 
High Court, allowed the appeal and decided that the claimant should not have 
relied on the draft accounts prepared by the defendant’s accountant without having 
them examined by its own accountants.45 The claimants failed to establish the 
proximity required under Caparo Industries, as to create the duty of care between 
 
 33. Id. at 483, 496, 504. 
 34. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 35. Id. at 608–09. 
 36. Id. at 619, 621, 627. 
 37. See id. at 619 (“In advising the client who employs him the professional man owes a duty to exercise 
that standard of skill and care appropriate to his professional status and will be liable both in contract and in 
tort for all losses which his client may suffer by reason of any breach of that duty. But the possibility of any duty 
of care being owed to third parties with whom the professional man was in no contractual relationship was for 
long denied. . . .”); see also id. at 659. 
 38. Id. at 620–21. 
 39. Id. at 642–43. 
 40. Id. at 654, 663. 
 41. [1991] 2 Q.B. 113 (Eng.). 
 42. Id. at 128. 
 43. See id. at 119, 127; supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 44. James McNaughton, [1991] 2 Q.B. at 117. 
 45. Id. at 128–29. 
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the accountants of the target company and the bidder.46 Consequently, the claim for 
damages failed.47 
Additionally, Lord Justice Neill highlighted that even though the law regarding 
the duty of care for negligent misstatements was somewhat clear, it could be 
widened so as to encompass people whom a statement’s maker did not expect to 
rely on the statement.48 
Several more cases have followed Caparo Industries, including the important 
decision in Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd.,49 where parties who 
purchased a franchise from a defendant company and incurred severe losses later 
claimed against the company. The claimants joined the company director as a 
defendant on the grounds that his personal lack of care in giving advice and 
negligently forecasting profits induced the claimants to enter into the agreement.50 
The claim failed on the grounds that not enough proximity existed between the 
claimant and the defendant directors as to prove that the latter assumed personal 
responsibility to the former.51 Consequently, the claimants could not prove that the 
company director personally owed them a duty of care.52 It is necessary to 
emphasize, nevertheless, that the House of Lords slightly opened the possibility that 
company directors could incur liability to third parties.53 A claimant need only 
prove that the way in which directors carried out the transaction created enough 
proximity between them and the third party.54 
In Electra Private Equity Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick,55 the UK Court of 
Appeal relied on Williams and confirmed that a clear assumption of responsibility is 
essential whenever it was sought to impose personal tortuous liability above and 
beyond that ordinarily assumed by a professional.56 Liability was nevertheless found 
in Morgan Crucible Co. v. Hill Samuel & Co.,57 where the target company intended 
 
 46. Id. at 128. 
 47. Id. at 125–27.  Lord Justice Neill considered six factors: (1) “The purpose for which the statement was 
made,” (2) “The purpose for which the statement was communicated,” (3) “The relationship between the 
adviser, the advisee and any relevant third party,” (4) “The size of any class to which the advisee belongs,” (5) 
“The state of knowledge of the adviser,” and (6) “Reliance by the advisee.”  Id. 
 48. Id. at 126–27. 
 49. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 50. Id. at 832. 
 51. Id. at 838. 
 52. Id. (“There were no exchanges or conduct crossing the line which could have conveyed to the plaintiffs 
that [the director] was willing to assume personal responsibility to them . . . [and] there was not even evidence 
that the plaintiffs believed that [the director] was undertaking personal responsibility to them.”). 
 53. Id. at 838–39. 
 54. Id. at 835. 
 55. [1999] All E.R. 415 (A.C.). 
 56. Id.  
 57. [1991] Ch. 295 at 296 (Eng.). 
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the bidder to rely on pre-bid financial statements and profit forecasts.58 
Consequently, there was enough proximity as to create a duty of care.59 
When auditors’ liability is established, the viability of the ex turpi causa defense 
remains unclear, although auditors successfully pled the defense in Stone & Rolls 
Ltd. v. Moore Stephens.60 Generally, the answer to this point lies in two of the most 
important principles underpinning company law: the relationship between the 
directors and the company, and the rules of attribution.61 
II. The Relationship Between the Company and its Directors, and the 
Rules of Attribution 
There are two leading theories which attempt to identify the complex nature of the 
relationship between companies and directors.62 Reality shows that directors 
manage a company’s assets and therefore establish a fiduciary relationship, which 
triggers a duty of good faith and loyalty.63 Additionally, a director can enter into a 
service contract with his company,64 giving rise to a number of contractual 
consequences and effects.65 Finally, directors are also a company’s agents, which 
imposes upon them a duty to act with skill, care, and diligence.66 
Arguably, finding the theory and/or principle upon which such complex 
relationships could be explained is far from easy. Nevertheless, two theories seem to 
have provided some answers: organic theory and agency theory.67 
Under the organic theory, which is usually associated with the alter ego doctrine, 
directors act as the company itself, rather than for it.68 The requirement of 
mandatorily having to appoint directors forces the amalgamation between the 
 
 58. Id. at 298–99. 
 59. Id. at 320. 
 60. [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) 1435 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 61. See Jennifer Payne, Corporate Attribution and the Lessons of Meridian, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LORD 
HOFFMANN: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR LEONARD H. HOFFMANN (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.co 
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2444732. 
 62. See L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 165, 193 (5th ed. 1992); infra text 
accompanying note 68. 
 63. See Ross Grantham, The Content of the Director’s Duty of Loyalty, 1993 J. BUS. L. 149, 151 (U.K.). 
 64. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 227 (U.K.) (defining a director’s “service contract” as “a contract 
under which a director of the company undertakes personally to perform services (as director or otherwise) for 
the company”). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. § 174 (“A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”). 
 67. GOWER, supra note 62, at 193. 
 68. See id. at 197.  Under the organic theory, “the board of directors is not a mere agent of the company 
but [rather] an organic part of it so that third parties can treat acts of the board as acts of the company itself.”  
Id. 
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company and those who think and act for it.69 Directors are therefore seen as an 
organ of the company, without which it cannot function.70 Now, company decisions 
could be made by its primary decision-making body (directors, board of directors, 
or shareholders acting collectively), or by other persons who may act as company 
agents.71 When any of these decision-making bodies act on behalf of the company, it 
does so as the company itself, as an organ merged with the company. Individuals in 
these bodies cannot incur personal liability.72 Therefore, it is the company itself 
which enters, for example, into contractual relationships with third parties. 
The agency theory, on the other hand, works slightly differently.73 Under this 
theory, directors and other officers, including managers, act as a company’s agents.74 
The theory presumes that officers act for a company, so they are not amalgamated 
to it.75 When decisions are made by agents who represent the company, the general 
rules of attribution apply, or in other words, the rules applicable to any principal-
agent relationship.76 Agency theory automatically triggers the rules of express, 
implied, and ostensible authority, to say nothing of the principles of vicarious 
liability.77 Although the distinction between agency and organic theory has been 
criticized as “unhelpful,”78 it still plays a crucial role in establishing individual or 
corporate liabilities.79 When the general rules of attribution apply, directors and/or 
company officers are more likely to incur personal liability to third parties.80 
 
 69. See id. at 140 (“[T]he initial constitution of [a] company will provide for the appointment of a board of 
directors and expressly delegate all powers of management to it. . . . [The constitution] operates an appointment 
and delegation by the company.”). 
 70. See id. at 196. 
 71. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 27, at 165. 
 72. Id. (“Where the board or the shareholders collectively act, they constitute the company, ie they act as 
the company. They are not its agents. Consequently, they will not be personally liable on any resulting 
contract. . . .”). 
 73. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 74. GOWER, supra note 62, at 140. 
 75. See id. at 139 (“[A] company is itself a legal person, with an existence independent of that of its 
members.”). 
 76. Id. at 139 n.1 (citing Ferguson v. Wilson, [1866] L.R. 2 Ch. App. 77, 89 (Eng.)). 
 77. See id. at 165 (summarizing agency law and attribution principles). 
 78. Peter Watts, Corrupt Company Controllers, Their Companies and Their Companies’ Creditors: Dealing 
with Pleas of Ex Turpi Causa, 2014 J. BUS. L. 161, 161 (U.K.) (“The first unhelpful idea is that, in relation to 
common law wrongs, companies are special in that they have two sorts of representative[s] for whose acts the 
company may be liable, those who are ‘the directing mind and will’ or the ‘alter ego’ of the company, and those 
who are only ‘agents.’”). 
 79. See GOWER, supra note 62, at 194. 
 80. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 27, at 226 (noting that lawsuits typically target company 
directors, who “are much more likely to be in a position to initiate such action on the company’s part than 
shareholders”); see also ADOLFO PAOLINI & DEEPAK NAMBISAN, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE 
125 (2008). 
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One might question why a piece of research, purportedly trying to cover 
auditors’ liability and their defenses, is touching on these quite philosophical ideas. 
The answer is that it is precisely here, in the rules of attribution, that auditors could 
rely on public policy grounds to escape liability.81 
In Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.,82 a leading authority for the 
alter ego principle, the House of Lords attributed to a steamship company the 
knowledge that one of the directors and shareholders of a managing company had 
in regard to faulty boilers that made a vessel unseaworthy.83 The facts of the case 
were basically the following: according to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894,84 a 
shipowner is not liable for any loss or damage caused without the shipowner’s 
actual fault or privity, where the cargo on his ship is lost or damaged by fire.85 The 
ship’s defective boilers caused a fire that destroyed the cargo (benzine).86 The ship 
was owned by one company, but another company took the management of the 
vessel.87 The managing director of the managing company was also the registered 
director of the shipowner company.88 The managing director knew about the 
defective conditions of the boilers but he failed to properly instruct the captain and 
members of the crew as to the way in which the boilers should be supervised, and 
took no measures to prevent the vessel from being put to sea in such an 
unseaworthy condition.89 The issue to be resolved was whether the shipowner 
company could rely on the Merchant Shipping Act to escape liability, on the 
grounds that the fire which destroyed the cargo happened without the company’s 
fault or privity.90 
Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane issued one of the most quoted and cited 
opinions in company law: 
I think that it is impossible in the face of the findings of the learned judge, 
and of the evidence, to contend successfully that Mr. J. M. Lennard has 
shown that he did not know or can excuse himself for not having known of 
the defects which manifested themselves in the condition of the ship, 
amounting to unseaworthiness. Mr. Lennard is the person who is registered 
 
 81. See Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petrol. Co., [1915] A.C. 705 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); 
infra notes 132–43 and accompanying text. 
 82. [1915] A.C. 705 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 83. See id. at 706–07, 713. 
 84. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, § 502 (U.K.). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Lennard’s, [1915] A.C. at 708. 
 87. Id. at 710, 712. 
 88. Id. at 712. 
 89. See id. at 707 (“[The director received a letter] complaining that there was something greatly wrong 
with [the ship’s] engines and boilers.”). 
 90. Id. at 712; see Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, § 502 (U.K.). 
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in the ship’s register and is designated as the person to whom the 
management of the vessel was entrusted. He appears to have been the active 
spirit in the joint stock company which managed this ship for the 
appellants; and under the circumstances the question is whether the 
company can invoke the protection of s. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
to relieve it from the liability which the respondents seek to impose on it. . . . 
Now, my Lords, did what happened take place without the actual fault or 
privity of the owners of the ship who were the appellants? My Lords, a 
corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it 
has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be 
sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an 
agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the 
very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation.91 
The close connection between the director and the controlled companies was 
such that the House of Lords attributed to the shipowner company the knowledge 
that the director had in regard to the vessel’s unseaworthiness.92 The court rejected 
the argument that the managing and shipowner companies were distinct entities;93 
consequently, the shipowner company could not rely on the Merchant Shipping Act 
to escape liability.94 The alter ego doctrine was to some extent established;95 the 
director was not acting on behalf of the company, but rather acted as the company 
itself in regard to what he knew were faulty boilers.96 
One may think that the attribution of knowledge found in Lennard’s could 
happen only where the person whose knowledge is so attributed occupies a 
prominent position or controlling position in the company. However, the rules 
have gone as far as to cover company officers who are not, in principle, discharging 
managing positions.97 In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v. Securities 
Commission,98 the Chief Investment Officer of an investment management company 
purchased substantial shares in a public issuer on behalf of the company.99 
 
 91. Lennard’s, [1915] A.C. at 712–13. 
 92. Id. at 713. 
 93. See Lennard’s, [1915] A.C. at 714 (“[T]he inference to be drawn is that the officials of the two 
companies were very much the same and transacted very much the same business.”). 
 94. See id. at 713–14 (finding that the managing director’s actions were “action[s] of the [shipowner] 
company itself within the meaning of s. 502”). 
 95. See id. at 713; GOWER, supra note 62, at 197. 
 96. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Meridian Global Funds Mgmt. Asia, Ltd. v. Sec. Comm’n, [1995] 2 A.C. 500 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from N.Z.) (holding an investment management company liable for its Chief Investment Officer’s actions). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 503. 
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According to New Zealand securities law,100 the company should have notified 
regulators of such a large purchase, but it failed to do so.101 In applying the rules of 
attribution, the Privy Council found that the company knew it was a substantial 
holder of shares in a public issue, and that it acquired such knowledge when the 
investment officer purchased the shares.102 
The Privy Council did not suggest that a low-hierarchy officer could be the 
controlling mind and will of the corporation, but it did find that the investment 
manager’s knowledge in regard to the purchase of shares was enough to make the 
company aware of the transaction with the resulting consequences.103 Lord 
Hoffman, in deciding the case and upholding the appeal, clearly explained the rules 
of attribution by classifying them into three groups: primary rules of attribution, 
general rules of attribution, and special rules of attribution.104 His explanation is 
worth quoting here: 
The company’s primary rules of attribution will generally be found in its 
constitution, typically the articles of association, and will say things such as 
“for the purpose of appointing members of the board, a majority vote of the 
shareholders shall be a decision of the company” or “the decisions of the 
board in managing the company’s business shall be the decisions of the 
company.” There are also primary rules of attribution which are not 
expressly stated in the articles but implied by company law, such as “the 
unanimous decision of all the shareholders in a solvent company about 
anything which the company under its memorandum of association has 
power to do shall be the decision of the company[.]” 
These primary rules of attribution are obviously not enough to enable a 
company to go out into the world and do business. Not every act on behalf 
of the company could be expected to be the subject of a resolution of the 
board or a unanimous decision of the shareholders. The company therefore 
builds upon the primary rules of attribution by using general rules of 
attribution which are equally available to natural persons, namely, the 
principles of agency. It will appoint servants and agents whose acts, by a 
combination of the general principles of agency and the company’s primary 
 
 100. Securities Amendment Act 1988, § 20(3) (N.Z.) (requiring “[e]very person who . . . becomes a 
substantial security holder in a public issuer [to] give notice” to the public issuer and any stock exchange that 
lists the public issuer’s securities). 
 101. See Meridian, [1995] 2 A.C. at 504–05. 
 102. Id. at 511 (“The fact that [the investment manager] did the deal for a corrupt purpose and . . . did not 
want his employers to find out cannot in their Lordships’ view affect the attribution of knowledge and the 
consequent duty to notify.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 506–07. 
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rules of attribution, count as the acts of the company. And having done so, 
it will also make itself subject to the general rules by which liability for the 
acts of others can be attributed to natural persons, such as estoppel or 
ostensible authority in contract and vicarious liability in tort. . . . 
The company’s primary rules of attribution together with the general 
principles of agency, vicarious liability and so forth are usually sufficient to 
enable one to determine its rights and obligations. In exceptional cases, 
however, they will not provide an answer. This will be the case when a rule 
of law, either expressly or by implication, excludes attribution on the basis 
of the general principles of agency or vicarious liability. For example, a rule 
may be stated in language primarily applicable to a natural person and 
require some act or state of mind on the part of that person “himself”, as 
opposed to his servants or agents. This is generally true of rules of the 
criminal law, which ordinarily impose liability only for the actus reus and 
mens rea of the defendant himself. How is such a rule to be applied to a 
company? 
One possibility is that the court may come to the conclusion that the rule 
was not intended to apply to companies at all; for example, a law which 
created an offence for which the only penalty was community service. 
Another possibility is that the court might interpret the law as meaning that 
it could apply to a company only on the basis of its primary rules of 
attribution, i.e. if the act giving rise to liability was specifically authorised 
by a resolution of the board or a unanimous agreement of the shareholders. 
But there will be many cases in which neither of these solutions is 
satisfactory; in which the court considers that the law was intended to apply 
to companies and that, although it excludes ordinary vicarious liability, 
insistence on the primary rules of attribution would in practice defeat that 
intention. In such a case, the court must fashion a special rule of attribution 
for the particular substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation: 
given that it was intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to 
apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose 
intended to count as the act etc. of the company? One finds the answer to 
this question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into 
account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and 
policy.105 
Consequently, attributing to a company the knowledge or wrongful conduct of 
any of its directors or officers is more likely to happen in small corporate bodies, 
 
 105. Id. (citations omitted). 
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where controlling the company and becoming the mind and will is not so 
difficult.106 Look for example to Lennard’s case,107 where the House of Lords found 
no difficulty in identifying the appellant company’s alter ego, and concluded that 
the alter ego had knowledge of the faulty boilers.108 This finding was possible 
because the structure of the corporate group was not too large or complex.109 The 
point is that the larger and more complex a company, the more difficult to find or 
identify its controlling mind. In very large corporations, like public limited 
companies, it is almost impossible to conceive that one individual or even a group 
could be the controlling mind for the purpose of attributing to the company their 
knowledge or wrongdoings. 
III. Is the Company the Victim or the Agent of the Wrong? 
The main purpose of this Article is to clarify in what circumstances company 
auditors could successfully rely on the ex turpi causa defense to escape liability to 
the company following a claim for breach of their professional duty of care. Cases 
concerning corporate fraud abound, and in most scenarios, stakeholders and 
shareholders have suffered substantial losses as a result.110 Very often, the targets of 
these claims are company directors, whose breach of duties are thought to be the 
cause of financial collapse.111 In the United Kingdom, third-party claims do not 
succeed very often when plaintiffs contend that directors owe their duty to the 
company, not outsiders.112 Not in vain, liquidators have attempted to go beyond the 
veil of incorporation and seek some redress from directors’ pockets, usually having 
professional indemnity insurers in mind.113 The Insolvency Act of 1986 opens the 
 
 106. See Vrinda Bhandari, Meridian to Iridium: An Analysis of Attribution, 23 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. 
REV. 253, 253–54 (2012) (U.K.) (observing that regulators often cannot “pinpoint liability on one single 
employee” in large corporations). 
 107. Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petrol. Co., [1915] A.C. 705 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 108. Id. at 712–14; see supra text accompanying notes 92–96. 
 109. See Lennard’s, [1915] A.C. at 712 (emphasizing Mr. Lennard’s dominant role in the company); supra 
text accompanying note 89. 
 110. See Fred J. Naffziger, In America, A New Approach to the Imposition of Financial Fines in Cases of 
Securities Fraud, 21 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 172, 172 (2006) (U.K.) (discussing the “wave” of corporate fraud 
in early-2000s America, and the “financial pain” and “collateral damage” it inflicted upon shareholders). 
 111. See John Clemency & LeGrande Smith, Corporate Fraud: Where Should the Buck Really Stop?, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2002, at 20, 20 (“In the past, assigning personal liability for the frauds of the corporation 
has centered on (1) principals—corporate officers and directors who orchestrated, or at least had knowledge of, 
the fraud, and (2) employees of the corporation who breached a specific duty or duties owed to the corporation 
such as a breach of fiduciary duty, of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, of loyalty, trust, confidence and the 
like.”). 
 112. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 170(1) (U.K.) (providing that a company director owes duties “to the 
company”). 
 113. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 27, at 228; see also PAOLINI & NAMBISAN, supra note 80, at 1. 
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doors for directors to incur liability for wrongful and fraudulent trading,114 but this 
resolves nothing in regard to whether auditors could somehow challenge that the 
connection between directors and the company is such that they are not only the 
controlling mind whose knowledge, act or omissions should be attributed to the 
latter, but also that the company itself has become the fraudster along with its 
directors. In a very eloquent way, the situation has been described as follows: 
“Courts around the Commonwealth continue to confront cases where company 
controllers, in the form of directors or shareholders or both, engage in illegal 
conduct, and the courts have to settle how the company itself stands in relation to 
that conduct,” either as victim or co-perpetrator of the illegal act.115 
Whether the company is considered one with its directors or is still separate 
from them is the point at which companies could be deemed agents or victims of 
wrongful acts.116 As we will see later, auditors can successfully invoke the ex turpi 
causa defense only in the former scenario.117 
In In re Hampshire Land Co.,118 a company’s articles of association allowed 
directors to borrow money on behalf of the company up to a certain limit, which 
could not exceed the company’s paid-up capital, unless duly authorized by the 
general meeting of shareholders.119 The general meeting gave such consent to the 
director, but the notices that announced the meeting did not specify, as the 
regulator required, that the meeting would deal with such authorization.120 The 
company borrowed the money from another company, which shared the same 
secretary.121 In short, the secretary worked for both the lender and the borrower.122 A 
resolution to wind-up the company was passed and the liquidators challenged the 
validity of the borrowing agreement.123 The point at issue was whether the shared 
secretary’s knowledge—that the general meeting of shareholders had not duly 
authorized the directors to borrow money in excess of the limit capped by the 
articles of association—was attributable to both companies.124 If so, the act was ultra 
 
 114. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 213–214 (U.K.) (instructing courts to hold liable “any persons who were 
knowingly parties” to fraudulent business activities). 
 115. Watts, supra note 78, at 161. 
 116. See infra notes 132–45 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra notes 132–45 and accompanying text. 
 118. [1896] 2 Ch. 743 (Eng.). 
 119. Id. at 743 (quoting the articles of association). 
 120. See id. at 747 (“[N]o notice was given . . . [and] therefore the authority of the directors of the company 
to borrow this money was not perfected.”). 
 121. See id. at 745. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 744–45. 
 124. See id. at 747. 
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vires.125 Furthermore, the two companies were closely connected and four directors 
held office in both companies.126 Justice Vaughan Williams decided that such 
knowledge could not be attributed to the company: 
Where is the line to be drawn or what is the test to be applied in order to say 
whether or not in each case the knowledge of the common officer is the 
knowledge of each company employing him? It seems to me . . . that the 
knowledge which has been acquired by the officer of one company will not 
be imputed to the other company, unless the common officer had some duty 
imposed upon him to communicate that knowledge to the other company, 
and had some duty imposed on him by the company which is alleged to be 
affected by the notice to receive the notice.127 
It is necessary to emphasize that the company was not controlled and the 
directors were not the will and mind of the corporate body.128 Additionally, a 
number of shareholders authorized the company director to borrow the money, 
even though they were not directors and lacked managerial powers.129 This last point 
has proved very powerful as a defense to corporate fraud claims.130 
Principles underpinning the rules of attribution reached their summit in the 
eagerly awaited decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens.131 The House of 
Lords, by a 3:2 majority, was of the view that the auditors of a company controlled 
by its sole shareholder could successfully plead the ex turpi causa defense to stop any 
claim against them instigated by the company, when the company itself and its 
controlling mind were both found to be the co-perpetrators of fraud.132 In this case 
 
 125. Id. at 745–46.  A transaction proceeds “ultra vires” when it exceeds the powers expressly or impliedly 
authorized under the corporate charter or articles of incorporation, or violates a statutory restriction.  Charles 
E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49, 49 (1923).  In the U.K., the 
Companies Act of 2006 abolished the ultra vires doctrine.  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 31(1), 39 (U.K.).  
Section 31 provides: “(1) Unless a company’s articles specifically restrict the objects of the company, its objects 
are unrestricted.”  Id. § 31(1).  Section 39 reads: “(1) The validity of an act done by a company shall not be 
called into question on the grounds of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company’s constitution. (2) 
This section has effect subject to section 42 (companies that are charities).”  Id. § 39. 
 126. In re Hampshire Land Co., [1896] 2 Ch. at 744. 
 127. Id. at 748. 
 128. See id. at 746. 
 129. Id. at 744, 747. 
 130. See, e.g., Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) 1451 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (attributing a director’s knowledge to his company and upholding auditors’ ex turpi 
causa defense); Bilta Ltd. v. Nazir, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 968, [2014] Ch. 52, 109–10 (Eng.) (Supreme Court 
appeal pending) (refusing to attribute a director’s knowledge and actions to his company where the company 
itself claimed that the director had breached his fiduciary duties). 
 131. Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1391. 
 132. Id. at 1391–92, 1451. 
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the company’s sole shareholder entered, on behalf of the company, into a series of 
transactions (letters of credit) with a bank.133 The company initially complied with 
its contractual obligations, but the controlling directors started to gradually 
misappropriate the company’s money and deviate it beyond the reach of the 
company’s creditors.134 As a consequence, the company defaulted on its payments 
and the bank (creditor) was faced with the fact that the company was insolvent.135 
During the period when the directors misappropriated money, Moore Stephens was 
the company’s auditing firm.136 A liquidator was appointed, and he tried to 
maximize recoveries to pay for the company’s debts.137 The director was not to be 
found, so the liquidator (on behalf of the company) sued the auditors who had 
failed to discover the fraud.138 
The auditors admitted that they breached the duty of care by failing to discover 
the fraud; nevertheless, they defended the claim on the grounds that, as a fully 
controlled company, the fraudulent act of the company’s controlling mind should 
be attributed to the company.139 The auditors argued that both the director and the 
company were fraudsters, such that the company could not bring claims against the 
auditors for failing to discover the fraud that the company itself had committed.140 
The company could not rely upon its own misconduct to prevail against the 
auditing firm.141 The House of Lords accepted this argument and dismissed the 
claim.142 
The House of Lords distinguished Stone & Rolls from In re Hampshire Land Co. 
with a novel and controversial analysis.143 They found that when, in the company 
 
 133. Id. at 1398–99, 1507. 
 134. Id. at 1471, 1507. 
 135. Id. at 1480, 1507. 
 136. Id. at 1471. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1472. 
 139. Id. at 1449. 
 140. Id. at 1449–50.   
 141. Id. at 1449. 
 142. Id. at 1451; see supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Robert Merkin, Fraud and Insurance Agents: The Law After Moore Stephens, in 3 MODERN LAW OF 
MARINE INSURANCE 59, 65 (D. Rhidian Thomas ed., 2009) (“Mr. Stojevic perpetrated a proven fraud on third 
party banks in the name of his company. Under the ordinary rules of attribution laid down in the Meridian 
Global Funds decision, the fraud was attributed to the company. That meant that the company bore primary 
liability to the banks. Any claim by the company against its auditors for failing to prevent the illegality was 
doomed to failure on the basis of ex turpi causa. At no point was the imputation of knowledge, or the Re 
Hampshire Land Co exception to imputation of knowledge, of any significance to that outcome.”).  Lord Justice 
Mance, in his dissenting opinion, gave a very eloquent speech: 
The world has sufficient experience of Ponzi schemes operated by individuals owning ‘one-man’ 
companies for it to be questionable policy to relieve from all responsibility auditors negligently 
failing in their duty to check and report on such companies’ activities. The speeches of my noble 
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structure, there are shareholders who do not form part of the board and do not 
have managerial duties, and a fraud or tortious act has been committed by persons 
with managerial functions, the company will frequently be seen as the victim, not as 
the wrongdoer.144 This last argument is paramount for the defense of illegality to 
proceed.145 
Whether a company is primarily or vicariously liable depends on a number of 
circumstances, one of which has been eloquently described in the following way: 
Is the corporation to be perceived as a villain devising a Machiavellian plan 
to defraud a third party or to create a deliberate environmental catastrophe 
in its operations or to cause a death, injury or destruction to those who 
stand in its way? Or should the corporation be perceived as a victim whose 
soul has been ripped apart by the machinations of the very people who are 
the directing mind and will of the corporation, and who ostensibly clothe 
themselves under the guise of a corporate veil that cannot be pierced, while 
seemingly trying to protect the corporation’s interest, but actually protect 
their own?146 
Safeway Stores Ltd. v. Twigger147 was another important decision on this point. In 
this case, some employees and directors fixed the price of dairy products, which 
caused the company to incur a serious fine for breaching competition rules.148 The 
 
and learned friends in the majority have that effect. In my opinion, English law does not require 
it. I consider that the key to a proper resolution of this appeal is to bear firmly in mind: (a) the 
separate legal identities of a company and its shareholders; (b) the common law and contractual 
duties which it is common ground that auditors owe and which included in this case an express 
undertaking to comply with auditing standard SAS 110 on fraud and error of the Auditing 
Practices Board; (c) the rights that a company has as a result as against those who, whether as 
officer or auditor, commit wrongs against it; (d) the distinction between on the one hand a 
company’s claim for its own net losses, for which it is entirely consistent with Caparo 
Industries . . . that it should be able to sue auditors whose negligence led to such losses, and on 
the other hand its creditors’ losses, for which under Caparo its creditors cannot sue negligent 
auditors; (e) the basic company law principle that the interests and powers of shareholders yield 
to those of creditors in a company which is actually or potentially insolvent. I differ from the 
majority speeches in this case because they fail in my respectful opinion to take these points duly 
into account. 
Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1505–06 (referencing Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.) 626 
(appeal taken from Eng.)). 
 144. Id. at 1462–63. 
 145. Id. at 1438. 
 146. Saleem Sheikh, The Corporation: Villain or Victim?, 19 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 348, 348 (2008) 
(U.K.). 
 147. [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1472, [2011] Bus. L.R. 1629 (Eng.). 
 148. Id. at 1632, 1634. 
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issue was whether the company had incurred primary or vicarious liability.149 
Should the company have incurred primary liability, it would be precluded from 
recovering its losses from the guilty managers on the grounds of public policy.150 
However, should the company incur vicarious liability through the acts or 
omissions of any of its employees, the company would be liable to indemnify the 
victim or pay the fine but will also have a cause of action against the wrongdoers 
(either the company’s employees or their D&O insurance carrier).151 In Safeway 
Stores v. Twigger, the employees suggested that the company was prevented from 
claiming against them the money it paid for the fine on the grounds of public 
policy, because it was the company itself who breached competition rules.152 The 
Court of Appeal agreed with this, albeit on different grounds: 
Once it is appreciated that the claimant companies are (personally and not 
vicariously) liable to pay the penalties exigible under the 1998 Act, those 
companies cannot invoke the Hampshire Land principle to say that they 
were not “truly” liable. The principle gives them no defense to the [Office of 
Fair Trading’s] claim for the penalties; they are personally liable to pay 
those penalties and it would be inconsistent with that liability for them to be 
able to recover those penalties in the civil courts from the defendants. The 
statutory scheme has attributed responsibility to the claimant companies 
and the Hampshire Land exception to the ordinary rule of attribution can 
have no import on the application of the ex turpi maxim.153 
However, in a company the size of Safeway, it was impossible to attribute to the 
company the acts or omissions of the so-called managers because it was impossible 
to prove that these managers were the “directing mind or will” of the corporation.154 
Had the company been small and controlled by one shareholder, Stone & Rolls 
arguably would have applied (High Court position).155 
 
 149. Id. at 1635–36. 
 150. Id. at 1634–35, 1641. 
 151. See Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for Supervision and Management: 
Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1666–67 (2010) (discussing 
corporate directors’ and officers’ tort liability for acts they commit within the scope of employment); PAOLINI & 
NAMBISAN, supra note 80. 
 152. Safeway Stores Ltd., [2011] Bus. L.R. at 1631. 
 153. Id. at 1639; see Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, § 36 (U.K.); In re Hampshire Land Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 743 
at 749–50 (Eng.). 
 154. Safeway Stores Ltd., [2011] Bus. L.R. at 1638–40 (attributing fault to Safeway, not its managers). 
 155. See id. at 1635–36 (“The difficulty and novelty of the present case is that the claimants are a 
corporation and can only act through their human agents. If it is those human agents who have acted 
intentionally or negligently and have thus caused the corporation to become liable by way of penalty to the 
OFT, does the maxim apply to preclude recovery of that penalty and its consequences from the very employees 
and directors whose conduct has created the corporation’s liability? The judge has held that it arguably does not 
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In Bilta Ltd. v. Nazir,156 (also known as Jetivia v. Bilta) the defendants lost a suit 
brought by company liquidators on the grounds of conspiracy and dishonest 
assistance and fraudulent trading under Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986.157 
Bilta was a company registered in the UK and its main business was trading in 
European Emissions Trading Scheme Allowances—carbon credits for short.158 It 
had two directors, one of whom was its sole shareholder.159 It carried out most of its 
business with several sellers in Europe, especially a company named Jetivia Ltd, 
which happened to have the beneficiary of most of the sales proceeds Bilta earned in 
the UK.160 Due to the fact that Bilta bought from suppliers outside the UK, its 
transactions were exempt of Value-Added Tax (“VAT”).161 Nevertheless, all sales 
made by Bilta to UK buyers were subject to VAT, and as it happened in the present 
case, Bilta sold to UK purchasers for less than it had originally paid.162 It is clear 
from the facts that the whole structure was devised to evade the VAT.163 Selling 
carbon credits at a loss meant that Bilta was not liable to pay VAT in the UK, where 
its liabilities reached £38 million.164 
The liquidators claimed against two company directors, who had diverted funds 
to off-shore accounts controlled by Jetivia (a Swiss company) and THG (another 
foreign company).165 The liquidators alleged that the directors had breached their 
fiduciary duties to Bilta and violated the rules of company capital maintenance to 
the detriment of creditors (the tax man).166 
In an attempt to avoid liability, the directors purported to rely on the ex turpi 
causa defense,167 by arguing that the company should be attributed with their 
 
because it has not been shown (at this stage of the proceedings at any rate) that any of the defendants was the 
‘directing mind or will’ of any of the claimant companies; he thought that unless that could be shown it was 
impossible to say that the claimant companies were ‘personally’ at fault, and the maxim only applies where the 
claimant was ‘personally’ at fault, as accepted by Mr Jonathan Sumption QC in argument in Stone & Rolls . . . 
and confirmed by the House of Lords in that case. . . .” (citing Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] 
UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) 1459–61 (appeal taken from Eng.))). 
 156. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 968, [2014] Ch. 52 (Eng.). 
 157. Id. at 59–60; see Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 213 (Eng.). 
 158. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 80. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.; see VAT: How to Work Out Your Place of Supply of Services, GOV.UK (July 1, 2014), 
https://gov.uk/vat-how-to-work-out-your-place-of-supply-of-services (“If [a company is] in the UK and the 
place of supply of [the company’s] service is in another EU country, [the company does not] pay UK VAT.”). 
 162. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 80. 
 163. Id. at 59–60, 82. 
 164. Id. at 80. 
 165. Id. at 59, 80–82. 
 166. Id. at 83–84. 
 167. Id. at 84. 
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knowledge and wrongdoing.168 In other words, the two directors claimed that the 
company co-conspired with them and, on the grounds of public policy, could not 
sue them.169 This was a clever attempt, but it did not succeed.170 Contrary to the 
decision in Stone & Rolls, where the defendant was an outsider (the auditor),171 in 
Bilta, the defendants were the company directors who inexorably owed duties to the 
company, of which the duty to promote the company’s success and consider its 
interests was essential.172 By diverting the company’s funds and rendering it 
financially unable to meet its debts, the directors breached their fiduciary duties.173 
This entitled the company to sue the directors for the losses it sustained.174 The 
Court of Appeal was of the view that the company was the victim of a fraudulent 
act;175 the company was used by the two directors to evade taxes, consequently the 
company had the right to claim against the fraudsters.176 Furthermore, the 
company’s claim did not implicate its own misconduct, falling outside the 
exception that the House of Lords established in Tinsley v. Milligan.177 As a result, 
the defendants could not attribute their own wrongdoing to the company and could 
 
 168. Id. at 89 (“In order to engage the ex turpi causa rule in this case the defendants must establish that the 
law attributes to Bilta the unlawful conduct of its directors and sole shareholder so that its actions against them 
and the defendants falls to be treated as an action between co-conspirators. . . . Put very simply, his case is 
that Bilta’s claim . . . discloses that Bilta was used by its directors and their associates to carry out a carousel 
fraud, the only victim of which was HMRC. Since Bilta was a party to the fraud, it cannot claim against the 
other conspirators for losses which it suffered as a result of the fraud it carried out.”). 
 169. See id. at 84 (describing ex turpi causa as a “rule of public policy”). 
 170. See id. at 110 (“This court is, in my view, bound . . . to hold that a director even of a one-man company 
can be held liable to account for breaches of fiduciary duty which he commits against the company.”). 
 171. Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) 1447 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 172. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 86 (“[T]he sole director/shareholder owes to the company the fiduciary duties spelt 
out in section 172 of the Companies Act and cannot use his control of the company to ratify his fraudulent acts 
against the company particularly where the interests of creditors would be prejudiced.”); see Companies Act, 
2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (Eng.) (“A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard (amongst other matters) to — (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the 
interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) 
the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the 
need to act fairly as between members of the company.”). 
 173. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 97. 
 174. Id. at 110 (identifying the company as “the victim”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 177. See [1994] 1 A.C. 340 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  Tinsley distinguished between (1) “reliance on 
the illegal act as the basis of the cause of action” and (2) “the enforcement of a property or other legal right 
which although historically the product of an illegal act or transaction, has an independent existence from it.”  
Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 85; see Tinsley, [1994] 1 A.C. at 376. 
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not use the ex turpi causa defense.178 Nevertheless, the court emphasized that 
auditors may rely upon the ex turpi causa defense when the wrongful acts of its 
controller are attributed to the company itself, which is seen as an instrument of 
fraud.179 It is the author’s view that such level of control and manipulation is only 
possible in small or medium size companies with a reduced number of shareholders 
and directors. 
IV. Conclusions 
One does not know what to expect after embarking on a research mission; the 
deeper one digs, the more difficult and even more confusing it becomes. However, 
some conclusions can be drawn from the above paragraphs. 
The reigning discussion in regard to the nature of directorship and the difficulty 
in clearly establishing when companies are agents or victims of a wrongful act 
reveals the uncertainty as to auditors’ real level of exposure when they breach or act 
below accepted professional standards. Arguably, the decision in Stone & Rolls 
opened the doors for courts looking well behind the veil of incorporation to 
identify wrongdoers and hold them personally accountable.180 Analysis of company 
size and structure is crucial if one wants to succeed in this identification process.181 
So, this is the list of what is needed for the ex turpi causa defense to succeed: 
 
1. The company must be controlled by the wrongdoer director.182 
Directors typically exert such control only in small and medium-size 
companies. 
 
2. The primary rules of attribution—making body of the company 
(directors, board of directors, and shareholders acting collectively)—are 
the foundation stone for the defense to proceed.183 When the company 
and its directors are seen as one, one could conclude that both parties 
are primarily liable or should be attributed with the same wrongful 
act.184 
 
 
 178. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 53, 110–11. 
 179. Id. at 111 (narrowly construing Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 
1391 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)); see supra notes 131–42 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1451; supra notes 131–42 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Stone & Rolls, [2009] 1 A.C. at 1451; Safeway Stores Ltd. v. Twigger, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1472, 
[2011] Bus. L.R. 1629 (Eng.) 1638–40; supra text accompanying note 155. 
 182. See, e.g., Stone & Rolls Ltd., [2009] 1 A.C. at 1391 (involving a corporation that one individual “owned, 
controlled, and managed”). 
 183. See Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 89–90. 
 184. Id. 
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3. To be deemed a victim rather than a co-perpetrator, a company’s 
shareholders must not have participated in committing the wrongful 
act.185 
 
4. The defense, as decided in Bilta, cannot be invoked by the company 
directors themselves.186 It is available only to outsiders.187 
 
Deciding Stone & Rolls otherwise would have led to the absurd situation of suits 
against company auditors for their failure to discover a fraud that the proper 
claimant committed.188 In a more eloquent way, let us imagine a letter addressed to 
the auditors in the following terms: Dear Auditors: You failed to discover my own 
corporate fraud, so I will be suing you! 
 
 
 185. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. 
 186. Bilta, [2014] Ch. at 84, 89, 110; see supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.   
 187. See supra notes 132–45 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) 1436 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (“Does common sense matter? Yes. It is contrary to all common sense to uphold a claim that 
would confer direct or indirect benefits on the corporate vehicle, which was used to commit the fraud and was 
not the victim of it, and the fraudulent driver of the fraudulent vehicle.”). 
